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August 21, 2006

The Man Who Saw The Future

This from Seraphic Friend Naomi Regan. An extremely important interview with former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon.

Friends,

Below is an interview the last IDF Chief of Staff, Moshe (Bogey) Ya'alon gave before he left office last year replaced by senior Israeli do-nothing, air-head politicians who didn't like the truth he had the courage to speak. Dan Halutz was his replacement, and we all know how that worked out. Read his words, and you will see how clearly he saw the situation, and how he was punished for his sanity. We should have listened to Bogey when he said the two-state solution was a mirage, and that we are involved in an on-going struggle no flim-flam is going to solve. See how the reporter's incredulity at his statement of simple truths no one would dispute. He was later lambasted for his appraisal by Avi Dichter, Israel's outgoing chief of intelligence, who was wrong about everything, continues to be wrong about everything, and is now proposing giving Syria the entire Golan Heights.

Naomi

*****

Parting Shots
By Ari Shavit Haaretz Magazine 3 June 2005
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/583843.html

Will he return? My guess is that he will. I used to think he wouldn't. Not under any circumstances. That he would disappear in the Arava desert and be a school principal. That he would go back to the barn on his kibbutz and
organize a volunteer project. But now things look different. Bogey's anger is subdued, but deep. His anxiety about Israel's corruption is almost existential.

Moshe ("Bogey") Ya'alon is not thinking in terms of a return now. All he wants to do is swim in the sea, read books and write. To be with Ada. At the end of the summer they are scheduled to take up residence in a research institute in Washington. But the public dynamic might be stronger than the plans of the outgoing chief of staff. No, he will not enter politics. But sooner or later, he is likely to findhimself leading the volunteer corps of the 21st century. The movement against corruption needs a face. It needs its Motti Ashkenazi - the reservist who led the protest against the government in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. And Bogey Ya'alon is not only the right candidate; he is the only candidate. Among those Israelis who held positions of power during the last decade, there was no one with a cleaner record. A principled ascetic. Honest and modest. An Israeli from another era: a man of truth.

The past few months have been hellishly hard. The affront. The agony. The feeling that rot has spread through the institutions of government. The fear that the rot is slowly infiltrating the Israel Defense Forces, too. But in the days ahead of his retirement, he recovered. So, when the time came to photograph him for this article, it was easy to tempt him to tell jokes.

Thus it happened that on his last Friday in the chief of staff's bureau, this tall, mummified, grim-faced officer had the interviewer, the photographer and the IDF spokesperson in stitches. Joke after joke. One outburst of laughter after another. A Ya'alon you never knew about. A Ya'alon we never knew. Bogey was almost bursting out of his uniform.

What will history say? Simple things: Director of Military Intelligence Ya'alon was one of the first to be suspicious of Yasser Arafat. Head of Central Command Ya'alon was the first to understand that an Arafat war was in the offing. Deputy Chief of Staff Ya'alon shaped the concept of the IDF's war against Arafat. Chief of Staff Ya'alon repulsed Arafat and, together with Prime Minister Sharon and Shin Bet security service chief Dichter, led Israel to a military victory over terrorism.

However, Ya'alon's rigidity and his inability to maneuver politically brought about a situation in which his relations with the government and media power centers were sour. As a result, he was alone throughout the entire course of the war. As a result, the moment the war ended, he was ousted. So that he himself will not be there at the critical moment this summer. He himself will not be there when we discover whether Ya'alon's war was a turning point or an exercise in futility. A war that produces stability or a war that produces more wars.

Reverse asymmetry

Lieutenant General Ya'alon, what was your mission in the past four and a half years?

"I have no doubt that life or fate or history brought me to
the boiling point and the point of decision in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It doesn't begin in these four
and a half years, in which I served as chief of staff and
before that as deputy chief of staff. It begins far before
that. I very much wanted to bring about the end of the
conflict. Very much so. I did not delude myself during the
Oslo period, but I had hope. When I took over as director of
Military Intelligence I started to ask questions. And I did
not get persuasive replies. Gradually the facts I
encountered started to change me. Until at a certain stage I
reached the conclusion that we were in a situation of
reverse asymmetry. That we were in retreat, whereas the
Palestinians were on the offensive. Therefore I thought that
our mission was to create a wall in the face of the
Palestinians. To prove to them that terrorism does not pay.
Yes, to burn that into their consciousness - even if there
are some who do not like that term. Because if we do not do
that, Israel will be in serious trouble. If the terror is
successful, it will continue even more intensively. It is
liable to inflict the next war on us and the next stage.
Therefore the wall of consciousness is essential.

Were you successful in building that wall?

"In part."

Where were you successful?

"The success lies in the fact that in this violent round we
succeeded in making the Palestinians aware of the need to
stop the terrorism. We did this by means of the transition
from defense to offense, from Operation Defensive Shield
[spring 2002] and afterward. You have to understand: a fence
does not solve the problem of terrorism. The fence is an
important means in the ability to prevent infiltration, but
it is not the ultimate means. The ultimate means is the
ability to get to the terrorist in his bed.

"Therefore, the freedom of action we acquired as a result of
taking control of the territory was what generated the
turnabout. It reduced the number of casualties; reinforced
our staying power; improved the economic situation; and
obtained international legitimization.

"In contrast, it made the situation of the Palestinians go
from bad to worse. Losses. Anarchy. The disintegration of
the social fabric. Therefore, even before the disengagement
plan and even before Arafat's death, they started to do some
mental stocktaking. The awareness was forged that terrorism
does not pay. That was the great Israeli achievement in this
war."

But you say the success was partial; what did not succeed?

"If after all this the Palestinians are talking about the
right of return in concrete terms and not just
declaratively, that means we did not succeed in building a
wall in the political sphere. On the Palestinian side, we
still find a viewpoint and thinking in terms of the phased
doctrine. The most significant development in this regard is
the Cairo agreement between Abu Mazen [Palestinian Authority
chairman Mahmoud Abbas] and Hamas. What Abu Mazen said in
reference to this agreement shows that he has not given up
the right of return. And this is not a symbolic right of
return but the right of return as a claim to be realized. To
return to the houses, to return to the villages. The
implication of this is that there will not be a Jewish state
here."

In other words, despite everything, despite four years of
war, even Abu Mazen is unwilling to accept the existence of
a Jewish state here?

"Even Abu Mazen. Even after four and a half years of war
against Palestinian terrorism, we have not succeeded in
convincing them to forgo their dreams about the return. All
we succeeded in doing is to convince them that terrorism
does not pay. From other points of view, too, the
Palestinian Authority has not liberated itself from the
Arafat era. When it permits Hamas to take part in the
elections without abandoning its firearms, is that
democracy? It's gangs. Armed gangs playing at pretend
democracy. For the Palestinians it is still convenient to
maintain a gang-based reality rather than a state
foundation."

"I will say what you are not saying: In these four years
there was a phenomenal Israeli military achievement.

"That is what foreign armies are saying."

But there was a failure in translating the military
achievement into a historic political achievement?

"Time will tell. I repeat what I said: we have a situation
of reverse asymmetry. The State of Israel is ready to give
the Palestinians an independent Palestinian state, but the
Palestinians are not ready to give us an independent Jewish
state. Thus the situation here is not stable. That is why
every agreement that will be made is the point of departure
for the next development of irredentism. For the next
conflict. The next war. Despite their military weakness, the
Palestinians feel that they are making progress. They have a
feeling of success. Whereas we are waging a battle of
withdrawal and delay."

Are you saying that historically, Israel is in a process of
retreat and delay?

"Clearly. Clearly."

We are retreating without achievements?

"We are retreating without our having a narrative. Without
our having an agreed story. Look, the whole question is
whether your withdrawal is perceived by the other side as an
act of choice or an act of flight. If it is perceived as a
flight, they will continue to come after you; it is is
perceived as a choice, everything looks different. As of
today, three months before the disengagement, it is still
not clear whether they will treat it as a flight or as a
choice."

Are we heading into a dramatic summer?

"There is no doubt that this will be a dramatic summer.
Until disengagement the interest will be to maintain calm.
What will happen after the disengagement? If there is an
Israeli commitment to another move, we will gain another
period of quiet. If not, there will be an eruption."

How serious is that eruption liable to be?

"Terrorist attacks of all types: shooting, bombs, suicide
bombers, mortars, Qassam rockets. It stands to reason that
in the initial stage they will have an interest in
demonstrating quiet in the Gaza Strip. But if there is an
eruption in Judea and Samaria, Gaza will not remain quiet."

Are you saying that the first violent outburst will come
from Judea and Samaria?

"Yes."

Because that is territory we have not yet withdrawn from?

"Correct. Over the years, the Palestinians have been trying
to show us that territory we leave becomes quiet. I have no
doubt that they will have in interest in demonstrating that
after the pullout from Gaza there will be a period of quiet
there. You left Gaza? You get quiet. You will leave Judea
and Samaria? You will get quiet. Leave Tel Aviv and things
will be completely quiet."

Do you see a return of the suicide bombings?

"Definitely. They will not forgo the suicide bombings. The
suicide bombings and the Qassam rockets have something in
common: they bypass the IDF. They are means of bypassing
Israeli military might and striking at the civilian
society."

By your logic, the Palestinians will now place Kfar Sava in
their sights?

"Of course. It is as clear as day to me. If we get into a
confrontation at the political level, if we do not give the
Palestinians more and more and more, there will be a violent
outburst. It will begin in Judea and Samaria."

So the cities on the border of the West Bank will be in the
situation of the Gaza line settlements? Kfar Sava's
situation will be that of Sderot?

"And Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, too. There will be suicide
bombings wherever they can perpetrate them."

What you are saying, then, is that there is a high
probability of the eruption of a third intifada?

"It is not an intifada. We have to stop calling it an
intifada. It is a war."

Let me rephrase: there is a high probability of a second war
of terror?

"Yes."

Within how much time?

"It depends how the story of this summer is recorded by each
side. And whether the disengagement is implemented under
fire or not."

Will the disengagement be implemented under fire?

"It is very probable that there will be a trickle of fire.
But if the fire is massive, the IDF will distance the
threat. Forces have been allocated for that."

Are you saying that in order to leave Gush Katif - the Gaza
settlement bloc - we will have to enter Khan Yunis?

"If there is shooting from there? Yes, we are deploying for
that."

No stability, everything is open

How long will the evacuation last?

"I don't know."

The chief of the General Staff does not know how long the
evacuation of the Gaza District will last?

"The question is whether we evacuate 8,000 residents or
20,000 Israeli citizens or maybe 50,000. If you evacuate
8,000, it could last three weeks.
If you have to evacuate more, it could take longer."

A minimum of three weeks and a maximum of three months?

"I treat all the numbers on this subject with a grain of
salt."

In other words, we have an open process here?

"In terms of the timetable? Yes. It is not easy to evacuate
people from their homes against their will."

As the one behind the operative plan of the evacuation of
the settlements, what worries you most?

"A subject that worries me a great deal is that there will
be a decision by the elected level in Israel that the army
will not be able to carry out."

Could that happen?

"We are readying for all scenarios. The army will implement
the mission. Even if takes more time, the army and the police will carry
it out. The problem will not be the army's implementation
ability, but the combination of things. You start the
operation and things happen and the government stops you. In
such situations, government decisions can be made during the
course of the operation."

Is that a feasible scenario?

"In certain conditions, everything is possible. And a
situation in which the government has made a decision that
the state is unable to implement is liable to be traumatic."

What you are saying is that the disengagement is not yet a
fait accompli?

"If and when we complete the move, we will talk about a fait
accompli."

Did you say 'if'?

"I have experience. I live in the ambiguity in which I live.
And I live the reality that I live."

Part of that reality is Hamas. Does that organization's
strengthening stem from the disengagement?

"There is no doubt that Hamas has appropriated the
disengagement. But the reason Hamas is getting stronger is
that Fatah is corrupt."

Is it possible that Hamas will take over the Gaza Strip?

"It is."

Is it probable?

"If Fatah continues to behave as it does now, Hamas will
eventually take over the Gaza Strip."

So in two or three years we are liable to find ourselves
facing a Hamas-led Gaza Strip?

"Yes."

Can Israel allow itself a Gaza Strip that is controlled by
Hamas?

"We are strong enough to come up with solutions for
everything. But it will not bring stability. It will oblige
us to be confrontational."

Do you see the IDF returning to the Gaza Strip?

"I do not rule it out."

Do you see additional operations such as Defensive Shield in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

"I do not rule out anything. We are not reaching a situation
of stability here. And when the situation is not stable,
everything is open."

Do you still think Israel is creating a tailwind for its
enemies?

"I do not like the political use that was made of my
professional statements. But to say that in regard to
certain situations one need not be chief of staff."

Overall, are we headed for a situation of dividing the land?

"In the past decade, the government of Israel and Israeli
society decided to divide the land. In the present reality,
I see difficulty in producing a stable situation of
end-of-conflict within that paradigm."

A story divorced from reality

I am not sure I understand what you mean.

"We are talking about a viable Palestinian state. Those
kinds of situations can be created in Europe: Monaco,
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg. But here the situation
is different. The Palestinian side does not harbor a feeling
of thus far and no farther - not even in regard to the 1967
borders. They are talking about Safed and Haifa and Tel Aviv. And
economically, too, Judea and Samaria and Gaza are not a
viable state."

So are you saying that the thought that a two-state solution
is within reach, is incompatible with reality?

"That paradigm does not bring about stability, no."

You maintain that the two-state solution cannot work. You
maintain that what is agreed by the whole world and a large
part of the Israeli public is without foundation.

"It is not relevant. Not relevant. It is a story that the
Western world tells with Western eyes. And that story does
not comprehend the scale of the gap and the scale of the
problem. We too are sweeping it under the carpet."

What will happen if the world nevertheless imposes a
two-state solution in the years ahead?

"It is difficult to impose things that have no foundation.
Something that is imposed and is unstable blows up."

What alternative paradigm do you posit in place of the
two-state paradigm?

"The paradigm of a far longer process. Far longer. One that
obliges above all a revolution of values by the other side.
Another possibility is to go beyond the paradigm of the
Western Land of Israel, to enter into regional solutions."

Are you proposing to give the Palestinians land that is
beyond the Western Land of Israel?

"We were in that situation before 1967: the West Bank was
connected to Jordan, the Gaza Strip to Egypt. Today it is
not relevant. But let us not delude ourselves. I do not see
stability in the present paradigm and in the present state
of affairs. I do not see a conclusion to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in my generation."

Is the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza
Strip and in 85 to 100 percent of the West Bank not
feasible?

"That is an idea that does not bring about a stable
situation. No. We can go for that, but from there the
confrontation will continue."

So the establishment of that Palestinian state will lead to
war?

"Yes, at some stage."

Could that war be dangerous for Israel?

"Of course."

Can the establishment of a Palestinian state in the present
conditions create a semi-existential threat to Israel?

"If that solution were to be imposed tomorrow morning it
would bring about the continuation of the irredentism, the
continuation of the conflict."

Is the idea that a Palestinian state can be established
during the current term of office of U.S. President Bush,
and stability achieved, divorced from reality?

"Divorced from reality."

And dangerous?

"Dangerous, of course."

If a Palestinian state is established now, will it
necessarily be a hostile state?

"It will be a state that will try to undermine Israel. As
long as there is no internalization of our right to exist as
a Jewish state, and as long as there is insistence on
concrete elements of the right of return, any such agreement
will be like the construction of a house in which you plant
a bomb. At some stage, the bomb will explode."

So what you are saying is that the idea of an immediate
Palestinian state and of a two-state solution is a mirage.

"We have created a paradigm that generates an illusion. We
have to think in long-term historical terms. Think about a
lengthy process. Not something that is finished here and now
and gives us an end to the conflict. There is no such
solution now."

The sword must remain drawn

So the parting words of the outgoing chief of staff are that
in this generation and perhaps in the next one, too, the
sword will be an integral part of our lives?

"Without a doubt, without a doubt. And let us hope we can
make do with a sheathed sword. In the realm of conventional
wars, we have succeeded. Our sword is sheathed. Why is it
that the army no longer has to fight wars of the 1967 and
1973 type? Because of our might. Because of the advantage we
have acquired, which is mostly blue-and-white. The Israeli
brain, Israeli technologies, Israeli fighters. That is why
the sword is sheathed. But in the sphere of terrorism and in
the sphere of the other capabilities which are trying to
bypass the army and strike at the civilian population, our
sword must remain drawn. It must remain drawn every day."

Is this what Israeli mothers are supposed to tell their sons
and daughters?

"Yes. They have to tell them that they were born into a
society of struggle.

"We should be happy that we have a home to defend. I have
just returned from a visit to the death camps in Poland:
once we did not have that [a home], either. And when we did
not have a home, we saw what happened to us there 60 years
ago. Not only a home for Israelis. For the whole Jewish
people. But we have to continue to struggle for that home.
To fight for our independence."

Are we in the midst of this struggle?

"Certainly. It is less intensive than when five countries
invaded in the War of Independence, but it is not over."

What are you saying to Israelis as you conclude your term as
chief of staff? What hope are you giving them?

"Shortly before the outbreak of the current confrontation I
gave a talk to a group of civilians. At the end of the talk,
a mother got up and said: `What you are saying is that I
deluded my children when I told them they were going to live
in a Western society of abundance; what you are saying is
that we have not reached a situation of peace and security
and we are still a society of struggle.' I told that mother
that what she said was my
recompense: if that is the conclusion she draw from my
remarks, my talk was worthwhile.

"What am I saying to the Israeli public? I am saying that we
are still a society of struggle. We have not reached a
situation of peace and security.
The cup is full. Very full. But it has to be said clearly
that we are a society of struggle. With no illusions.
Without false beliefs that we will resolve it with one move
or another. No. It will not be resolved. And we have to see
that with open eyes. It has to be said clearly. We have to
prepare for the future with forbearance. With staying power.
To broadcast this quiet strength. But under no circumstances
to confuse ourselves with hopes that turn into illusions,
which people try to translate into working plans that do not
connect with reality. And not to immerse ourselves in the
obsession that we are always to blame. We have to understand
that what is now on the agenda is the question of our right
of existence as an independent Jewish state. That is the
subject. That is what we are still struggling for."

Do you harbor an existential fear?

"Of course. In the intelligence appraisal I submitted in
1998 I said that the existential threat lies precisely in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Not Iran and not Syria and not Iraq, which still existed
then. Those are not existential threats. There is one
internal existential threat which concerns me very much, but
I will not discuss it as long as I am in uniform. But the
external existential threat is the Palestinian threat.

"Not that I am not concerned that Iran will have a nuclear
bomb. But I am not worried that the bomb will fall here. I
am worried about submerged processes it is liable to foment
in the region. Whereas in the Palestinian case, I see that a
combination of terrorism and demography, with question marks
among us about the rightness of our way are a recipe for a
situation in which there will not be a Jewish state here in
the end."

Your outlook is exceptional - you are not part of the
Israeli consensus.

"That is nothing new. Since November 1999 I have seen the
writing on the wall: a war is about to break out. And I have to deploy for
war when the situation of the Israeli consciousness is that
peace is around the corner, that by summer of 2000 we will
have peace. But even afterward, even after the fire erupts,
there is a disparity between my conception of the
confrontation and that of the people I work with. I remember
myself coming to cabinet meetings and meetings of the
Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee during the
war and asking myself where they are living and where I am
living. The gaps are enormous. The feeling is that you are
fighting over a hollow arena."

Did you feel alone; that you were not understood?

"Of course. But first of all I felt deep worry. Because when
you have to use force you need the backing of Israeli
society. It is impossible to activate force without backing.
Impossible. I call that intra-Israeli legitimation. I knew
how to explain why we have to demolish homes in Rafah in
order to prevent Katyushas falling in Ashkelon, but I was
stopped because someone saw a photograph of one kind or
another and had something to say. I saw those photographs
every day. But I came with a deep feeling of the rightness
of the way even when I was forced to demolish a house. But
when you do not have intra-Israeli backing, you stop.
Therefore, because of lack of agreement about the diagnosis,
we moved from defense to offense very late. We paid a high
price in human life only because of a lack of understanding
about what happened to us here. Because of lack of agreement
about the story."

That loneliness was a fundamental part of your term, was it
not?

"The most difficult moments of the war came during the
meetings of the security cabinet. You try to exert influence
about a certain matter and find yourself almost alone. You
find yourself without agreement about who the enemy is and
what the war is about. A commander is always alone.
Certainly a chief of staff. But in this case it was far
beyond personal loneliness. It is the understanding that you
perceive the situation in this way and everyone else
perceives it differently. When what is at stake is the fate
of your nation and your country, that is hard. Very hard."

Did your ouster pain you?

"This is not the moment to talk about that. Throughout my
service I tried to eradicate phenomena of a criminal
subculture. As though the law were an off-the-shelf product,
ethics an off-the-shelf product. If you want, you use it; if
not, you don't. And there is above the table and under the
table. And an officer who is vigilant about honesty and
integrity is a dolt. An officer who operates by manipulation
and speculation is smart.

"In my eyes all this is a sickness, and when a sickness
touches senior figures it is already a terminal disease. I
tried to fight against that terminal disease. I waged a war
of principle against it. Therefore, when the moment you are
speaking about arrived, I thought that a very problematic
message was being conveyed. But my feeling is that I lost a
battle, not a war."

Will Citizen Bogey continue to wage that campaign from the
place where Chief of Staff Ya'alon stopped?

"I am still in uniform. I need disengagement."

Posted by Robert J. Avrech at August 21, 2006 09:04 AM

Comments

Seraphic Secret is private property, that's right, it's an extension of our home, and as such, Karen and I have instituted two Seraphic Rules and we ask commentors to act respectfully.

1. No profanity.

2. No Israel bashing. We debate, we discuss, we are respectful. You know what Israel bashing is. The world is full of it. Seraphic Secret is one of the few places in the world that will not tolerate this form of anti-Semitism.

That's it. Break either of these rules and you will be banned.

Posted by: Jack at August 21, 2006 11:57 PM

Posted by: Robert J. Avrech at August 22, 2006 01:04 AM

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