A great analysis, all around the world our potential enemies have been studying the west and America's armed forces in particular.Aysymetrical warfare has thrown up new and well thought out challenges to our military and no doubt an outbreak of 'conventional' warfare would too.To think that anybody will attempt an old fashioned toe to toe fight is insane....along with armour and air the new wars of the future will feature everything from internal terror to international law...we need new clear blue water thinking....our enemies are not standing still or fighting the wars of yesteryear.

Yes Marshall was a great man, and his accomplishments before and during WWII excuse him in my mind from what seems to have been his personal opposition to the establishment of the state of Israel, (anyone can make a mistake).

I believe the blame should be extended to the Bush administration for failing to grasp that war has changed. This is an unconventional war being fought using unconventional methods. So why then did the US launch a conventional war against the Iraqi state. While it won that short war with ease, it was totally unprepared for the unconventional warfare that followed.
Competent commanders understand that warfare changes with time. In 1991 the Iraqi army were incinerated from the air, most of them never even laid eyes on an american soldier before they got lit up. Anybody who assumed that they would put on their uniforms and get in their tanks again only for the slaughter to be repeated was a fool. The American military is so superior, one of the drawbacks to this is that Americas enemies will not fight on Americas terms. They will fight unconventionally, ya know why, they are not just in it for show. They want to win. I think George Marshall would have grasped this, Donald Rumsfeld certainly didn't.

If you'll indulge me, here are a few thoughts from a green-suited infantryman:

1. Wow! It is truly refreshing to read this perspective from an Air Force officer. I have shouted it from my soapbox for years, but that's what you would expect from an Army guy. I am happy that you are not the only Air Force officer I have heard this from--the right men to lead your service in its next generation aren't going to be hard to find.

2. Don't minimize the risk from "peer competitors." We infantrymen haven't seen any real threat from the sky in half a century because the Air Force is so darned good at air superiority. You've worked yourselves out of a job, but if we don't retain the capability to own the skies, guess what our opponents will start building next? All skilled warfare is asymmetric--you attack the enemy where he is weak. If we're weak in the sky, or at sea, that's the place to hit us. If we are unable to win a toe-to-toe fight, look for us to have to face hordes of enemy infantry. Iraq and Afghanistan should not blind us to the other types of combat we can face in the future, any more than Desert Storm should have blinded us to the possibility of what we face now.

3. As a lifelong soldier (more than a quarter century, war and peace, since I was 17 years old), I cannot fault Bush and Rumsfeld for their tech-centric approach to Iraq and Afghanistan. It demonstrates complete ignorance of history and the nature of warfare, but it has always been every soldier's and politician's dream (and every Air Force general's promise) to be able to prosecute war without risk of loss of life. Bush and Rumsfeld believed it possible thanks to heavy propaganda from many quarters, and while this was a blunder, it is forgivable. No battle plan survives contact with the enemy. The measure of a wartime leader, private or president, is not how good his crystal ball is, it's how he adapts to reality as it rushes at him.

4. What is unforgivable is their insistence on fighting the war the same way after the evidence showed that their methods were not doing the job. "Fight the enemy, not the plan" is a common saying among infantry trainers. It means that after you have completed your planning and launched your attack, watch what actually happens with an open, adaptive mind, and deal with the reality you face as revealed by your actions and the enemy's counteractions. If you are locked in to the idea that the enemy can only react in one specific way, everything you see will tend to confirm your opinion as you watch the fight unfold, and you will still be in Iraq five years later.

5. Which leads us to the point of the author's insight in this article. A risk averse officer, a bureaucrat, a man with rigid thinking can't adapt to his plan falling apart (in battle, all of them do). He'll just hold fast to his pre-battle assumptions as articles of faith, and will synchronize his attack on a strict timetable that will never reflect reality on the ground. And even if he doesn't lose, he will never win.

Great article--I can't wait to read your next one. Robert's geopolitical pieces always inform and enlighten me, his film history pieces entertain and delight me, and his tactical pieces almost inevitably draw too-long comments from me.

Virgil

Virgil:

I loved your last point. In history, this has served to hurt us many times. The worst case was the Battle of the Bulge. Our Enigma intercepts told us the Germans were massing for a major counterattack, but our top officers refused to believed it because it didn't fit their model of German military strength at the time. The result was a lot of American deaths that should have been avoided.

am a non-Military man,
so please forgive my confusion here ...

after the Air Force does its high-altitude precision destruction of enemy armor, (as in the beginning in Iraq), don't the ground troops get support from Army helicopters and Navy carrier-based aircraft?

it would seem (at least to someone like me, who doesn't get the *unwritten* details of how things really work)
that if the person in charge of co-ordinating military efforts of all the services
(?Joint Chief of Staff?)
would mandate appropriate support from each service to any other needing it for their missions,
and the individual services could be relied upon to complain if the support is not as it should be,

then is it really that bad if the Air-Force strives for a 'zero-accident' level of performance?

i somehow feel 'safer' knowing that the people who fly aircraft containing nuclear weapons, and who are in charge of missiles with nuclear warheads,
take as little risk as possible,
and tolerate no accidents ...

now,
if the individual services get 'too-caught-up' in themselves, and *don't* provide adequate support to the fighting units who need it,
and the lives of those men and women are endangered,

then,
how hard would it be to 'leak' the relevant details to the press
(who, in general, aren't great supporters of the military, and who would have a 'field day' with it)
and 'force' a change to get rid of the people whose narrow interests endanger the capability of the military as a whole,
and also endanger all of us, and all in the free world, who look to the American military for aid and protection

(just my 'naive' 2 cents,
and would be fascinated to hear 'more'
from the people who 'really know' ...)

Jake:

It's funny how the brain processes information. I can remember any number of things where I had pre-decided the outcome, and everything I saw "confirmed" what I believed. Think about job applications, national elections, anything where you had a strong interest in the outcome, and you've probably done the same.

I try to teach leaders to plan against the enemy's MOST LIKELY course of action, but to also consider the full spectrum of what he might do instead and plan against that as well. It can be back-of-the envelope planning, nothing detailed, but if you have identified the indicators that will hint which course the enemy is ACTUALLY taking, and treat the situation as a puzzle to figure out, you can rapidly understand reality as it unfolds, and adapt the flexible plan you have developed to meet reality.

Moltke said that given three possible reactions to your attack, then enemy will always take choice number five. The best leaders can adapt to that. As you have layed out with the Ardennes example, the others get people hurt.

Virgil

Exdem:

Great point. You are not that far off from reality, and I see nothing naive in what you write. Just overlay human nature on to it, and you've nailed it.

The Joint Chiefs help coordinate the Services' missions, but assigning priorities isn't easy. The Air Force has a mixed bag of missions. The author of the above piece can write with more authority on this, but I know they have responsibilities for air superiority (shoot down the enemy's planes), air support (shoot stuff that's on the ground bothering us infantrymen), and air transportation (bring food and mail to us infantrymen).

Not only is it hard to figure out the right mix of assets to meet these missions now, they also have to try to structure the force to meet future challenges. Add to that parochialism. Which of the three Air Force missions I've layed out is sexiest? Most likely you, like me, will answer "air superiority." Most of the high achievers in the Air Force would rather be "Top Gun" than deliver my mail (Kelly McGillis wasn't smooching a C-130 driver), and as that type rises to the top, they steer assets into the areas that their experience has taught them are most important. Through no fault of their own, their experience is often too narrow.

Congress also gets involved, mandating purchase of set numbers of certain airframes to benefit businesses and citizens in key districts. There's not a lot of votes to be bought by having the Army add three infantry divisions, but you can do well getting the Air Force to buy 25 more C-130Js.

Add to this the legion of articulate partisans for each service who will forcefully argue for funding and building armed forces to fit their particular visions of what we need (like the network centric morons Rumsfeld, Gingrich, and company worshipped in the 90s), and you have real difficulty sorting out what we actually need. Bush and Rumsfeld were both military pilots in their younger years. With few infantry and special forces vets in positions of power in either party, who was competent and had the standing to tell the POTUS and SECDEF they were wrong? The Air Force won that bit of interservice sparring. The Army has some pull right now, but we'll be forgotten when we bring the troops home, because the US will decide that "we don't do nation building," as though it were our choice which battles we fight.

There are a few vets with extensive service who are running for office now (I am watching and rooting for retired lieutenant colonel Allen West, who's running for a congressional seat in Florida, even sent him money), and perhaps they'll help things a little.

But, as you see, it's only easy until you get into the details. I have no solutions to the problem, but I have learned a lot watching the process.

One technical gripe: The Air Force doesn't destroy much enemy armor--they take control of the skies. You didn't think of that because they're so good at it that you took it for granted. You refer to air support, which we need after the infantry and tank folks move in. Thanks to a merciful God, the air superiority crew didn't get to retire the world's best close air support platform, the A-10, in the 1990s as they tried. So (Kosovo notwithstanding), they CAN kill tanks, but they usually don't.

Did I answer most of it?

Virgil

Virgil,

" ... Did I answer most of it? ..."

yes, Thanks!

if memory serves correctly,
weren't Bush Sr. and Jr. both Naval Aviators?
(not Air Force?)

what portion of support do Carrier-based aircraft, and Army helicopters provide?

I enjoyed this. I am just a regular Joe who goes to work to earn a buck and it pains me to read something so obvious.

Life has never been static. It is always changing and if you don't figure out how to change with it you end up in a museum like a T-Rex.

One of the things that made Michael Jordan great was that as he aged he adapted his game. When he could no longer jump over the other players he developed new moves. There was always a counter to a counter.

I hope that other members of our armed forces will be as thoughtful and concerned about the state of things as you are.

Exdem:

Bush Sr. and Rumsfeld were Navy pilots, Bush Jr. was Air Force (Air National Guard). There is a difference between the two types, but both tend to become enamored with technological solutions, because in the end, they're just technicians (note my parochialism ).

I don't know percentages or numbers for close air support (CAS), but from personal experience I can tell you that Army choppers are responsive but breakable, and USMC aircraft of all types will help out Marines. The USAF is not user friendly for CAS. If you don't have an Air Force controller with you, they won't shoot for you.

Our author can probably give a better answer on the "how much" question.

Virgil

Thanks so much for all your comments.

The Air Force is slowly (and grumpily) edging towards an increased CAS role. They just invested in a life-extension program for the A-10s (although only after the Army said they'd take the retired Hogs off of the Air Force's hands) and they are steadily bumping up their UAV force.

But it's not enough. Careerists, jealously guarding their own turf as careerists do, tried to snatch platoon and company level UAVs from the Army via Congressional mandate and are still actively trying to prevent Navy and Army warrant officers from flying drones. Stupid, stupid, stupid.

It's ego. The Air Force has formalized Pilot worship into their culture. God forbid an enlisted man can work a relatively simple weapon system!

Virgil had some fine points on Congress complicating things. The Key West Agreement, which mandates acquisition guidelines for aircraft, was codified *I believe* when Marshall was Sec Def. It's still in effect. Congress needs to free up the Army to offer its own fixed-wing CAS.

Personally, after seeing the culture changes which have sucked the warrior-ethos dry from the service, I wouldn't be opposed to rolling the Air Force back into the Army.

Great read. I'd be curious to know what your opinion of the job that the AF Space Command is doing (if you have experience with them). With the nature of the space business, a major problem is the inability to do flight tests like you would with aircraft. Military satellites aren't like aircraft- they are all hand built, one-of-a kind and too expensive currently to do true on orbit flight tests with, and even reaching orbit can be problematical. With them risk management is very important, just look at how some of the civilian programs have faired in recent history.
It would also be interesting to know how the effects of the Clinton era Acquisition Reform (faster better cheeper.... pick two but not all three ;) ) which I think is the root problem of all the current military hardware challenges.

The officer rot as described above rings true in my experience. What's worse, I've had to witness Senior leaders discounting the very mission they are charged to perform. They will, through inaction and lack of faith, allow the mission and force capability they are sworn to maintain for the good of the American nation, at the direction of the duly elected government of the American people, to atrophy until very catastrophic and very public accidents (e.g. losing six nuclear weapons for a length of time) will cause the people to lose faith in the ability of the Air Force to perform it's missions.

The essence of the problem seems to be an emphasis on doing what is considered glamorous, cool, or "cutting edge" rather than focusing on the actual situation that needs to be dealt with. This happens in environments outside the military, too. In many corporations, for instance, the Information Technology people are more interested in applying the currently-hot software or methodologies than they are in solving the inventory control problem (or whatever.) In the schools, administrators are excited about using the latest instructional methodologies, often regardless of whether there is any actual evidence for their effectiveness.

Also, see these thoughts about promotion jobs by a Royal Navy officer...I suspect that jobs like these, in many kinds of organizations, have a *lot* to do with the reluctance to challenge the status quo.

Thanks so much for bringing this knowledge to readers like myself that wouldn't review this on our own.
Robert's blog equally elucidates the nuances of both love and war.

Enjoyed reading the discussion.

Being somewhat in the middle of this fight, as an Army attack helicopter pilot, I can see some of both sides of the argument. But being a Soldier first, I will do any and everything to support that Soldier on the ground.

USAF Officer, if the Air Force was sucked back into the Army I can only imagine the high pitched whine that would come from the flight line...and for once it wouldn't be a T-37 making it.

Having serving in Iraq twice now, I can say the USAF guys I've worked with were nothing but professionals who tried their best to do what they could. Unfortunately, where I worked (Baghdad) it was difficult as best for them to engage...they could however find things and give us target hand-overs. Individual crews were no problem to work with...but you could tell once one got above the Wing level, they were all about turf and what's mine and your's is your's and never the twain shall meet...kinda sad actually.

Virgil:

Robert's geopolitical pieces always inform and enlighten me, his film history pieces entertain and delight me, and his tactical pieces almost inevitably draw too-long comments from me.

You're comments are never too long. In fact, we delight in your articulate and always informative observations. Keep 'em coming.

I'd be curious to know what your opinion of the job that the AF Space Command is doing (if you have experience with them). With the nature of the space business, a major problem is the inability to do flight tests like you would with aircraft

I do have experience with Space Command. I trust them to keep birds circling the earth, but that's about it. Space Command is a bureaucratic nightmare. Granted, what you say is true, risk isn't exactly mission essential in the satellite flying business. But they deploy Airmen to theater just like the other branches of the Air Force, Airmen who bring their poisonous mentality into a realm that needs to be flexible, adaptable, and synergistic.

And these are people who can't even decide on uniforms and mission patches!

Individual crews were no problem to work with...but you could tell once one got above the Wing level, they were all about turf and what's mine and your's is your's and never the twain shall meet...kinda sad actually.

Yeah, I think you nailed it here. There's a fine crop of company-grade officers who recognize the rot for what it is and speak openly on the need for reform...

...but you don't think those are the guys who actually get promoted do you? Of course not. It's the yesmen who carry the Colonels' coffee for 3 years in a staff assignment. The flexible, agile thinkers... the reformers... those guys just take their Top Secret clearances and head off to make six-figures in the private sector.

Can't say I blame them.

And ditto Robert's comments re: Virgil, phenomenal commentary.. I'd like to hear more.

Amazing observation! As a wrench turning guy from Naval Air of the recent past, can see what is being said. There are few hit'em hard, hit'em fast guys left.
It is now a system of fitting the mold. That's why I never got anchors on my collar. It's now a world of "check the blocks" on your way up. This term was actually used in a counseling session I had with about 14-15 years in. I kid you not. I was even told by my division LCPO on my last our of shore duty in a RAG outfit that I was too black and white and "needed to develop more grey areas." The response was, "Chief, the airplane flies or the airplane doesn't fly. black and white world" I had 12 years in grade as a First Class Petty Officer when I retired from active service in September of 1993. In fact, the last four months of my career, I was the senior E-6 at the Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island. The gold crow and hashmarks had a distinguished tarnish on them.
As for weapons systems. My Step-son is in the Army Reserve and every grunt/truck and tank mechanic he knows love the A-10. Even Marines love the airplane, for one reason. It is the best close support platform we have.
As for Naval Air in the current world, the F/A-18 Hornet got better with the E and F models. They do have a greater combat radius than the legacy versions. They are hot rods and sort of good looking. But they still need tanker support. The new Navy tanker? A Super Hornet with drops and a buddy store. In the A-6 world we had KA-6Ds. Five drops, a hose reel package and a large internal bag. Hmmmmmmmmm? They are still sitting in the desert in AZ.
Just some ramblings from an Old Retired Petty Officer

Great article! I've wondered for years how many others saw the inherent problems with military leadership and thinking that gave me such heartburn. I've always felt that the vast majority of officers could be lumped into two categories:

1. Wartime Officers, who lead men, not beaurocracies, who can respond to the unexpected, and who are not afraid to take risks.

2. Peacetime Officers, who concentrate on getting along, protecting their ricebowl, and minimizing risk.

During the periods in our history where we enjoy at least relative peace, the Peacetime Officer rises to the top and takes firm control. The Wartime Officer is apt to ruffle too many feathers, and is usually forced aside.

When a major conflict erupts, the Peacetime Officers utilize men and equipment cautiously, often using the same strategy and tactics of the last war. This results in setbacks, losses and often failures that are the inevitable consequences of their mindset.

Eventually, those failings allow the Wartime Officer to replace those timid souls, and our military is put in a position where (politicians permitting) it can excel and succeed. When peace breaks out, the cycle repeats.

Just some thoughts from someone serving in the Navy from 1974 - 1991, and now the Air Force since 2004.

As an Air Force officer I agree with some of this, but just for historical accuracy:

Hitler was not building Tigers in the mid 1930s. I think the author meant "Panzers"- which was the generic term for "tank". The Tiger Panzer V didn't enter service until mid 1943 right before the battle of Kursk...

Thanks for the well-thought out and well-written article. Describing yourself as a Navy brat, I'm surprised you didn't use Commodore Edward Preble as your example (for the landlubber crowd, Google "Preble's Boys"), but I learned some new things about Marshall.

You're absolutely right that bureaucracy and empire-building are a cancer within the Air Force (and Washington in general.) My last assignment in the Air Force was at the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC), and there were plenty of petty fiefdoms there. There were plenty of smart folks doing good work too, but as others have mentioned, from middle management upward, there was the all too common trend of sycophants holding jobs they couldn't perform, even when those jobs were created specifically for them.

The problem is bureaucratic cancer, and I don't have the chemotherapy that will cure it. The answer to problems in Washington has always been to slap another layer of bureaucracy on top. Was the answer to poor communication within law enforcement and Intel to slap another layer on top as the DHS, instead of streamlining (and maybe combining) what we've already got? Unfortunately there is currently no mechanism to disassemble government offices groaning under their own weight, which means that for every Darleen Druyen caught, many more hide within the rat's nest without being seen.

The people who make it to leadership positions are, like politicians, those without any polarizing faults. A foul mouth, or a straight-forward demeanor, or excessive drinking, or anything else that might make that blade of grass stick up, gets it cut first. What's left over are non-committal chameleons, taught by the system not to take a definitive position on ANYTHING, for fear of attracting negative attention. Lack of action doesn't attract negative publicity... until it's too late that is.

I haven't completely given up hope yet though. The reason for this is that occasionally I see a petty emperor deposed, and a talented leader promoted. I served under Gen. John Jumper when he was a one-button commanding the CTF for Operation Provide Comfort. He had replaced a self-server (who later died in a C-21 crash, so I won't speak ill other than to say I still wonder if he had conned the crew into letting him fly before the crash), and Gen Jumper struck me as a smart man who led by example, and put the job before himself. He was later promoted to Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Contrast him with my Squadron Commander at the time. He got called on the rug by the 17th AF commander ("Bear" Chambers) after a gun port came off one of our F-16's in flight. The Bear told him to investigate and report back. The Sqdn CC delegated it to me. I paralleled the safety office's investigation, and found supervision occupied most of the links in the "accident chain". When I reported this to him, the commander dismissed me and blamed the airman at the bottom of the chain. Blaming supervision would reflect poorly on the commander, but he couldn't be held accountable for a "rogue airman". The last time I saw him, he came through NAIC for a briefing before reporting as an air attaché to Germany, after his career was finally halted at O-6.

My optimism has limits however. Since I left NAIC in '01, it's gained another letter (NASIC, the "S" for "Space"... I guess the cone-heads felt left out). It's also gained another 500 people, thanks in part to 9/11.

Blotto, General Jumper and General Marshall have a shared heritage. Both are VMI men.

As an Air Force NCO, I find this post a quite disturbing rehash of much of the anti-AF propaganda that seems to be everywhere these days. For one who purports to be an Air Force officer, this person seems quite uninformed of Air Force history and especially doctrine. Perhaps he/she should examine the roots of the doctrinal split in the employment of air and land forces back in 1943 and why this split continues today. That would be a start. Also, the author's liberal use of "they" when referring to the Air Force is quite strange for one who purports to be an AF officer.

Let's look at the substance of this post one point at a time:

1. Risk aversion and the contention the Air Force wants to avoid "risk at all cost. [SIC]"

The evidence for this assertion is a base DUI program? I might suggest that base DUI programs exist everywhere and in all services. I spent seven years in the Navy before I joined the Air Force and the AF was as is no different in this regard.

And ORM is tool to avoid unnecessary risk, not all risk. It's part of the mission planning process and I have personally seen missions flown when the ORM came in at high in a wartime environment. This officer's arguments come pretty close to alleging cowardice in my opinion. Peacetime ops on a base in the States and wartime ops overseas are two different things that are handled in different ways - something I had thought all officers were cognizant of.

2. Air Force PR. The author here talks about how all the "news" is against the Air Force. That most of these stories are anti-air force appears to be enough evidence to convince the author that what these stories say is true. I might suggest he/she examine alternatives and look deeper into the issue.

3. There's a bit in there about the F-22, the A-10 and CAS and UAV's, which are dime-a-dozen arguments among the anti-AF crowd. Unfortunately, the author just mentions them in passing, making allusions heard all too often, without any supporting evidence as if the facts are so well established that no elucidation is required. As a result, there isn't anything of substance for me to rebut here, but I would be happy to address any specific criticisms that may come up.

To conclude, there are a lot of problems with the Air Force and my service's leadership is certainly no exception. It's too bad the author here was not able to identify them in this post and instead focused on tertiary concerns and unsupported propaganda. I think the author should get off that base that annoys him/her so much and volunteer for the many 365 overseas tours that are now available to see what the real Air Force is like. I have friends at AFPC who can hook you up with one if you'd like. Alternatively, at your EOTS or when the next RIF comes around, check into the blue-to-green program; you can change into ACU's and if you get into the combat arms you're basically guaranteed to make LTC.

I see, he didn't say anything, but you're angry as honeybee about it, and if he had said anything, you'd refute every bit of it, and - if he wants to know the truth you'll send him off to combat duty ... like the lefty wackos scream Bush should do. I see. Yeah.
Now onto more important matters:
What hit home in the article for me was the risk aversion. Before the prior poster has another fit, I'll just mention that the risk aversion isn't just in the airforce, it instead- saturates and permeates our entire society.
Take for instance seat belt laws. Now you're guilty of the crime of a future incident of injuring yourself, even when it has never happened.
In a like manner, no doubt, and especially with all our thousands of archived and easily accessible by computer and otherwise scenarios of future happenings and statistics of an imaginary or planned battle on the field, the "risk taker" has a thousand mental midgets immediately screaming the statistical number of xxxxx that such a plan would painfully thrust upon our "psyches". Yes, don't forget the real injuries, but now everyone has a fragile noggin' and the inner child will be destroyed ( so the story goes), and I'm not talking about just the people in the service - as we've seen those against all the branches of the service have obviously stark inner child issues...
So, avoid it all must be the answer.
In Gary Bernsten's "Jawbreaker", among other places, it is said that the estimates of the losses "required" to stop AQ in the Tora Bora mountains (20,000 of them) and kill Osama was 750 US Service personnel. The cost was considered too high. The risk aversion won.
This is how our personnel are under lock and chain on the battlefield currently, while the beat goes on. Risk aversion says, don't unleash the dogs, and by no means are they allowed to kill the enemy like they should - we have other much more important concerns...
Call me all wrong, then tell me how many captured were executed after MC at GITMO... that number is zero publicly. One only prays that is the biggest lie we've heard yet from DC... but the psycho-social risk aversion says it's 100% accurate.
Softer, gentler, cautious, permission to fire sir, direct my trigger for me from far off on the computer screen feed, so I don't "lose it on the enemy" -, friendly to the Sadr's, bring them into politics, try for 5 or more years over and over again, the cozy liberal tree hugging is enough to make me, or anyone with a brain, puke.

Andy:

I am not the author of this piece, and am far from "anti-Air Force." Additionally, as an Army officer, I cannot comment with authority of the officer manning issues, so I will leave them to Air Force Officer.

I do have a few thoughts on being anti-USAF, strategic bombing, and CAS that I would enjoy hearing your comments on:

1. Being anti-USAF. It is not anti-USAF propaganda when people raise legitimate concerns about how to allocate scarce Defense resources. When Rumsfeld took over as SECDEF in 2001, his priorities were to streamline the military with computers and to prepare for an air/sea war with China. Guess what they were when he left, following 9-11, Afghanistan, and Iraq? Exactly the same. We consequently lost momentum in the war on Terror, by getting ourselves bogged down in a war that could have been won years ago had we gone with the solution Rumsfeld resisted—building more infantry divisions. Gates has a different vision--he wants to concentrate on winning the war at hand first. Given the current fight we are in, a re-ordering seems appropriate. It isn't anti-USAF to take resources that are not providing "bang for the buck" and move them to other, less sexy tasks.

2. The strategic role of the USAF. While discussing both "anti-USAF" and "propaganda," it is useful to review the factual record. The USAF is a supporting arm. Air power is NEVER decisive. The best it can do is smooth the way for decisive action. The USAF has been over-promising and under-delivering on the dream of cheap, decisive victory through air power since Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet. Examples off the top of my head:

- The blitz. Bomb British cities until the people force Churchill to sue for peace. We know how that turned out.

- WWII strategic bombing campaign in Europe. German productivity went up throughout the campaign. This according to the USAAF's own study

- Atomic bombing of Japan. The Japanese remained ready and willing to fight even after the second atomic bomb, until the Emperor intervened and said "enough." The USAAF even over-promised on the physical effects of the bombs, guaranteeing that Nagasaki would be an uninhabitable moonscape for the next 75 years (until 2020). The 1930s wooden ryokan I stayed in (within easy walking distance of the blast site) there a few years back indicates that assessment may have been overly optimistic.

- Rolling Thunder in Vietnam. Increase the pressure on the Vietnamese by destroying infrastructure until it brings them to their knees. We know how that turned out.

- Kosovo. Right after the campaign, the USAF claimed to have forced the Serbs out of Kosovo by destroying 110 Serbian tanks and 210 other armored vehicles with 3000 precision guided rounds over the 78 day campaign. Disregard the ratio of expensive bullets to targets killed--it gets worse. The actual damage was more along the lines of 13 tanks, and 100 armored vehicles. The reason the Serbs left Kosovo when they did was because they finished the ethnic cleansing they wanted to do, and they withdrew in good order. The clips of them rolling out (on undamaged armored vehicles) didn't look much different from what my mech platoon looked like after our training at the National Training Center. Nor were they observed dragging out destroyed armor, though NATO couldn’t find much of it when their troops rolled in. (The air campaign did manage to destroy five Serb hospitals, 470 housing units, and eight schools as collateral damage. Oops.) This air campaign was unopposed by an enemy air force.

- Afghanistan. Put Special Forces on the ground to guide bombs that will cause such destruction that the Taliban will be decisively defeated. Ran some of them them out of the country briefly, but we're still dying there.

- Shock and Awe. Force an Iraqi surrender by destroying their power grid and communications network. We know how that turned out.

3. CAS. Not much of an expert here, since I didn't see much USAF CAS during my year in Iraq. I saw the AC-130s do brilliant work for a few days in Fallujah in November 2004, but I never again saw the USAF put rounds on target. Part of the problem was that, although I was a field grade officer with plenty of training in adjusting artillery fire and navigating (I am a qualified Ranger and pathfinder), the USAF wouldn't shoot for me unless I brought along a USAF tactical air controller airman first class (equivalent to a private), which they could not provide me (in fairness, most established units have them down to battalion level—I was in an unusual assignment). My subordinate Marine team was able to help, though, because any Marine pilot will drop ordnance for any Marine on the radio. Rigid, risk-averse USAF thinking getting in the way of mission accomplishment? I think so.

4. Unfair snipe: Y’all are doing 365-day tours in the sandbox now? When I was there, it was just 90 days for the USAF. Welcome to the war! (You get a free shot after that rude example of my often sloppy impulse control.)

In the areas I discuss above, the problem is not that the USAF is evil or incompetent, it is that it doesn't sell a realistic picture of what it can accomplish. Whether through ignorance or dishonesty, this is unforgivable. And the USAF accomplishes a lot. As I mentioned earlier, US infantrymen haven't been strafed by enemy aircraft in more than half a century, because the USAF ALWAYS rapidly seizes control of the skies. The USAF also performs valuable resupply functions, drops paratroopers, and destroys targets that could be problems for attacking infantry and tank forces. The idea that we should strip down these capabilities because they aren't really problems any more is foolish, like the Bush1-Cheney "Peace Dividend" of the 1990s that we now pay interest on in blood.

But to suggest that the USAF can, now or ever, win a war is ludicrous. Because of this, they shouldn't keep the huge share of the defense budget they previously enjoyed. That's not anti-USAF, it's just responsible strategic planning.

Interested in your thoughts.

Cordially,
Virgil

Andy:

I also meant to thank you for your service, and your serious study of your profession. There is a big difference between brothers fighting and enemies fighting.

Regards,
Virgil

This is an excellent article, and it has elicited equally exceptional commentary/discussion. In my view, the tumor begins to form when officers see themselves as technicians, rather than warriors. I once had a young captain explain to me that NBC training wasn’t an Air Force priority because air assets are never exposed to such danger; besides (he continued), one can’t work on a/c engines or avionics in Mopp-4 gear. I wondered how any organization could maintain its equipment when all support personnel were lying dead along the apron. I continue to lament the loss of airmen and Marines killed while residing in comfortable barracks, when they should have been tactical – no matter how unpleasant it might have been. Of course, by the time a technician gets to general officer rank, there’s no way t o turn him around . . . he’s been reinforced in lethargy for the past 30 years.

We cannot escape bureaucracy, but we must do a better job managing it. Marines first developed the concept of close-air-support, and introduced it to the Army in late World War II and the Korean War. Over time, efficiency experts (touting joint doctrine) have decided Marines and Army units aren’t entitled to their own CAS assets – they belong to the theater commander. I can understand why we need to be able to support one another during combat operations, but let us consider that a Marine pilot is first and foremost a Marine; he has not only been trained to fly high performance aircraft, he has also served as a ground officer. Many Marine pilots have spent a “ground tour” as a FAC or air liaison officer. The point is that if the Air Force hopes to support a ground Army, then those two services need to speak the same language, be similarly motivated, and focus more on the strategic and tactical efficiency of their respective organizations, rather on their own selfish egocentricities. Army and Air Force pilots need to know how it is on the ground; when ground forces call for CAS, they don’t mean, “whenever convenient.” Providing CAS is already difficult (and risky) in the best of circumstances, but now imagine the consequences when a delivery pilot cannot distinguish between US and foreign troops and equipment. It has happened before, and the results (for our men) deadly.

I know . . . easier said that done. But the author of this piece is correct. We should remember the lessons taught to us by Billy Mitchell. We should remember it was the effort of visionary Navy/Marine officers in the 1920s who gave us amphibious doctrine and the same kind of thinking in the 1980 that developed MPF as a logistical strategy. There is no question American military forces are the best in the world, but we can always improve. And if we are not always looking to increase our value to the American people, our capabilities will only degrade. I do agree that if we intend to fix the rot (which a good friend tells me even permeates the Civil Air Patrol), then we need to rid ourselves of anyone who doesn’t seem him or herself as a combat officer. There are already enough civilians in the Department of Defense.

The original article and almost all the commentary give me hope that we will not only survive the current storm, but will 'win' the war in Iraq, 'win' in Afghanistan and reach some sort of equilibrium with the ismalic world (by that I mean the islamic world will come to grips and control to some degree the fundamentalists). With people who can look at their Services and the roles and missions, and provide honest assessments, there will always be leadership who will turn things around. I am a Marine reservist with several deployments under my belt and I will say that beaurocracy, risk aversion and inflexibility are not limited to the Air Force; they exist in all Services. I think several years of hard combat has forced the Marines and Amry to shed some of these parasites while the Navy and Air Force haven't yet had the luxury. I agree with Andy that DUI prevention programs on bases aren't causing risk aversion in combat - you can't fight if your men are dead or in the hospital. I do think however that 'political correctness' and fear of 'looking bad' are infecting all Services. I often wonder why we cannot drink in islamic lands when the past colonial powers have no problem 'offending' muslim sensibilities. If a kid can join and fight at age 18 or 19, why can't he drink a few beers after patrol on the FOB? If he proves incapable of controlling himself, the drinking stops. Unfortunately this is a pervasive new thought process in American society - restrict freedoms and choices so we don't 'offend' those in our society who refuse to adapt or the rest of the world.

BTW, when a Marine Air-Ground Task Force of any size fights as part of a JTF, more than likely excess Marine air sorties will be provided to the JFACC to prosecute JTF targets. The Marines have a Title 10 mission to fight as an air-ground team; that's why we have fixed and rotary wing air support, as Virgil so eloquently states, to support the grunts.

Silicondoc,

What hit home in the article for me was the risk aversion. Before the prior poster has another fit, I'll just mention that the risk aversion isn't just in the airforce, it instead- saturates and permeates our entire society.

Thanks for making my point for me. If the problem is with all the services or the society at large, why point only at the Air Force as the original author did?

In Gary Bernsten's "Jawbreaker", among other places, it is said that the estimates of the losses "required" to stop AQ in the Tora Bora mountains (20,000 of them) and kill Osama was 750 US Service personnel. The cost was considered too high. The risk aversion won.

You might also know from Bernsten's and other books that there weren't 750 troops available at the time. And anyway, estimates are only estimates and regardless, the decisions at Tora Bora were not made by the Air Force.

Maj. Hilts,

Thank you for your comments and service. I'll address your points below:

1. To begin with, the Army's manpower wasn't gutted by Rumsfeld. You'll have to look at the previous administration and Congress for that, though he certainly deserves much blame for not anticipating (or willfully ignoring) the force requirements for phase IV of OIF.

Regardless, the "resource" argument against the Air Force is a common one, but it's too often falsely portrayed as either-or. In other words it's not a question of funding future systems/capabilities vs funding the needs for the current conflict. IMO, both should be funded and if one looks at the actual requests and what Congress actually funds, that is largely what is happening. The biggest problem right now is manpower for the Army but the simple reality is that manpower cannot be quickly increased without a draft no matter how much money Congress throws at the problem. As you probably know, the Army is getting it's end-strength modestly increased and even then it will probably have trouble filling all those additional billets without increasing the CAT IV recruit pool. The problems of getting MRAPS, UAV's and other new capabilities has little to do with inadequate funding or resources and everything to do with the industrial capacity to make them and/or the training capacity, manpower and other minutiae necessary to employ them.

2. The Air Force understands it is a supporting service. Even the current CSAF has publicly said this. The Air Force knows its role and it is able to change as strategic requirements change. For example, SAC - Strategic Air Command - which was the heart of the service for almost its entire existence is gone. It went away back in 1992, right after the cold war ended. The Air Force saw it no longer needed a strategic air arm and reorganized. I don't think most realize the significance of that action nor appreciate how the Air Force is able to adapt to changing circumstances. While the Air Force got rid of its heavy strategic arm, what did the other services do and how long did it take them to reorganize? The Army got a late start, to put charitably.

You say air power is never decisive. I'd say most of the time you're right, but not always. In any event, that is besides the point. No element of military power is decisive on its own. We are all interdependent as one combined-arms team. In fact the ground element cannot be "decisive" on its own.

Finally, I have some quibbles with your historical examples but won't belabor them here. What I will point you to is this analysis (large pdf file) that gives the Iraqi perspective on OIF. The whole thing is worth reading, but the portion I want to point out begins on page 125.

3. CAS. New doctrine has been developed directly from lessons learned in OIF. There is now standard training and procedures across all the services for CAS, which is a big help. The initial problems with CAS have largely been solved. Now, pretty much anyone in Iraq/Afghanistan will have CAS overhead in less than 30 minutes which essentially makes it a QRF. Additionally, it's simply not true that any Marine pilot will drop for any Marine on a radio. Not bombing your own troops is good risk avoidance IMO, but hey, if you want the air component to ease drop restrictions then by all means write a paper and advocate for changing that doctrine.

4. Some tours are 365. Most are part of the regular AEF rotation cycle which is 4 months - it all depends on the billet. In general, if a unit deploys, it is for 4 months. Individuals deploying independently are more likely to get 365's. Similarly the Navy is on a 6-month rotation cycle which hasn't changed since at least the early 1990's. You Army guys are definitely getting the short-end of the stick this time around, no doubt about it. Unfortunately thats what happens when we start a ten division war with a five division Army. However, I still remember the 1990's when I was deploying my ass off (in both the Navy and Air Force) while it seemed like the Army was mostly having fun drinking beer and driving BMW's in their sweet Bavarian posts - just sayin' :)

But to suggest that the USAF can, now or ever, win a war is ludicrous. Because of this, they shouldn't keep the huge share of the defense budget they previously enjoyed. That's not anti-USAF, it's just responsible strategic planning.

You see, I think this is really the heart of most anti-AF arguments. It comes down to money and money is perceived as power and if the AF gets more money than some other service then that makes it somehow more powerful. Unfortunately, that argument is flawed for a number a reasons. First is that the Navy and AF get comparatively more R&D and procurement money because they rely on their machines in order to fight and operate in the environments they do. Without those "toys," as some call them, there wouldn't be any air or naval capability at all. Therefore one might argue that those services will always get a bigger chunk of the procurement pie because those "toys" are more complex and expensive than what is necessary for a ground force.

Secondly, warfighting is a joint and, increasingly, combined activity governed by joint doctrine. Joint doctrine doesn't give a rat's a$$ about which service funded and built which toy or military capability. Which capabilities are needed and how much are extensively studied in joint studies which form the basis of capability requirement laid out in the QDR. In other words, capabilities drive requirements as well they should. Once the question of needed capabilities is answered, the question then becomes, who should develop, procure, manage and operate those capabilities? What I'm suggesting here is that if you think the AF gets too much money then you have two choices: First, you can argue that air-related capabilities, as defined in the QDR, are not necessary. IOW, you can argue that the conclusions of the QDR are wrong and the overall force allocation is wrong. Secondly, you can argue that the capabilities are necessary but should be developed, purchased and managed by a service other than the Air Force. This, I think, is a harder argument to make.

So, if your goal is to take money away from the Air Force (or any other service for that matter) which is it and what is your specific proposal? You need to identify what capabilities you're going to sacrifice or why one service rather than another should manage a capability. Where is that money you take away going to go? Simply shuffling money to the Army isn't going to do much unless one can justify what capability that money will be used for and why that capability is more important than that which the money came from. And keep in mind that all these requirement are interrelated. When the size of the Army increases, guess what? More CAS is needed to support it. More naval and air logistics are needed to supply it. More ISR, satellite comms, etc. are needed so it can communicate. Etc. etc. etc. Nothing is an island and such decisions cannot be made in a vacuum and simply suggesting that one service deserves more money at the end of the day than another is parochialism pure and simple. It's one team, one fight, after all.

Mustang,

Over time, efficiency experts (touting joint doctrine) have decided Marines and Army units aren’t entitled to their own CAS assets – they belong to the theater commander.

No, it was getting our a$$ handed to us in North Africa that begot joint doctrine. That lesson learned was the reason air forces were thereafter independently managed from the ground force and it's the reason they still are today. It's the heart of the way we fight wars with centralized planning and decentralized execution. Overall, the system works pretty well.

Chris,

Good comments. The only thing I'll say is that I believe Marine air operating in a joint environment is not so much managed as deconflicted at the CFACC/JFACC level, particularly in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan, though I think you're right in suggesting that air assigned to a MAGTF always supports the MAGTF first and foremost.

Excellent article. Particularly the history lesson on Marshall’s boys. And some great comments and thought provoking ideas as well, from both the author and the many commentors. There are some areas that I would like to address myself, to help clear up some confusion that I believe may be causing unnecessary friction.

To begin with, I am an Air Force officer as well (but not, apparently, one of those beloved “company-grade officers” who like teenagers know everything if someone would only listen to them). I am a graduate and former instructor of the USAF Weapons School (which means I spend A LOT of time trying to figure out how best to employ our assets to kill the enemy in the most spectacular ways possible. This also means, that if you are not a “Patch wearer” you will find me to be gruff/arrogant/conceited/and much worse with little tolerance for “herbivores,” no offense to any who may be such). Finally, I’ve been to Iraq. I severed my time in Baghdad with the 1st CAV, so I speak Army about as fluently as any Air Force officer can and I know exactly what air power does and does not do in the current conflict.

What follows is going to be long winded. I hope you find it useful, I apologize if you don’t. In fact, I apologize for the bandwidth now, but this is an important discussion and I want to contribute to it fully. I have broken my responses up to make it easier to read...

Let’s deal with the issue of “risk” to begin with, and I’m going to take Andy’s side on this one. I have used ORM, when mission planning deep penetration SOF operations. And just as he explains, ORM is an attempt to avoid “unnecessary” risk. But that’s why the Special Instructions (SPINS) released with every Air Tasking Order includes the Combined Forces Air Component Commander’s (CFACC) acceptable level of risk (ALR). On some missions, we are allowed to lose every aircraft in the sky if we can accomplish our mission. Other missions, we are told to avoid the loss of even a single aircraft even if it means letting a fleeting target go by. There are men with big brains (referred to as SAAS-holes, graduates of the School for Advance Aerospace Studies) who work with the CFACC to identify what must be done to accomplish the mission. When you talk about SCUDs that could be tipped with chemical munitions pointed at Israel or coalition forces, the ALR is High. When you discuss a low-level Taliban commander who is driving through populated streets, the ALR is Low. We don’t avoid all risk, we avoid “unnecessary” risk. And this isn’t doctrine, I’ve been there, I’ve done that, and I’ve made the arguments for and against for real.

But you also have to understand, that the Air Force is “risk averse” as you claim because we have considerably fewer assets than anyone else. And if we break them, they are not Dorito’s we can’t just “make more.” For example, in February, we lost one of our B-2s to an accident on Guam. That was one of 21 aircraft, that’s a fairly significant drop in capabilities right there. Not to mention the fact that a) you can’t build a B-2 in any short timeline and b) they each cost $737 million to $2.2 billion to build. More importantly, however, is the fact that this represents exactly why the Air Force is so “risk averse,” the vast majority of our aircraft and airmen are lost in accidents NOT in combat. To an extent, you can accept combat losses, everyone understands that to accomplish the mission, sometimes not everyone makes it back. Its sad when that folded flag gets handed off to the young widow of a fighter pilot who augered in providing CAS, but its even harder when you can only say, “it was an accident that took away your husband/father/brother/son.” So yes, the Air Force pays very close attention to peace time safety. We have very few assets and we have a very small force of highly trained (read: long time training at high costs) personnel that we would actually like to have around for combat operations.

The Air Force does not believe that we can prevent accidents. The Air Force believes that through better education, better procedures, and closer supervision, we can mitigate many of the accidents that do kill our airmen or destroy multi-million dollar aircraft. We can excuse “accidents” we cannot excuse/accept “avoidable accidents.” Flying is a dangerous business, in combat or peace, and we have to take all *necessary* steps to ensure that we are not doing stupid things.

This flows nicely into the discussion about getting rid of the most beautiful aircraft ever built, the A-10. Some of you may recall last year when we had to ground the entire F-15 fleet because the jets were falling apart in the sky. The F-15 and the A-10 both rolled off the assembly line at roughly the same time. And the A-10 has also had structural problems that have had to be fixed. The reality, however, is that you can add a new stereo but that doesn’t make the airframe itself any younger. At some point, these jets will begin to fall from the heavens and it would be nice to actually have a replacement for it already programmed and built. That’s where the F-35 comes in. Its not a perfect replacement (how can it be without a GAU-8 snarling from the nose?), but then that’s why we need to field them sooner not later. We need time to figure out what modifications we need to make to make it better. The longer we put this off, the less capable it will be when it arrives and the more dire the situation with the A-10 will become for replacement.

We don’t always do this well. The Air Force still doesn’t have a replacement for the EF-111 (and now its getting worse as the Navy/Marines give up their EA-6Bs). But the best example of this is the F-16CJ, the replacement for the F-4G Wild Weasel. When the F-16CJ first took over the suppression of enemy air defense role, it wasn’t very good at it. It took time for the system to mature. Now, while there are still some diehards that think the F-4G is still better, the reality is that the CJ can do things far above and beyond than the 4G ever could. It took time to get there and there simply isn’t enough money, personnel, or basing around to maintain two assets at the same time for very long. So let’s get the F-35 into the field and start figuring out how to make it better before the wings come off the A-10.

Hallelujah brother, preach it! Couldn't agree more, just wish I had written it.

Couple of thoughts, mainly regarding Andy's comment...

Anything can be taken too far. It seems to me that ORM as practiced today in the military (but especially in the Air Force) is something that has been taken too far. Educating your people about the dangers of DUIs is fine. But the "101 critical days of summer?" Seriously? I'm an AFROTC cadet and before I participate in general aviation flight, sky diving, paintballing, ATV riding, or about 10 other activities (no exaggeration) I have to receive a safety briefing from one of my cadre members and sign a memo stipulating that I have, in fact, received the afore mentioned safety briefing and I acknowledge that I am engaging in "risky behavior." You're going to be hard pressed to convince me that that isn't going too far. Safety is fine, but when it becomes a distraction to the organization's main focus, it's a problem.

Regarding the bad PR, I'd be interested to see which "bad PR" you are saying "isn't true." Thomas Fiscus? Richard Hassan? Michael Murphy? Darleen Druyun? Thundervision? The fact that the CSAF is part of the round 2 of investigations for Thundervision? The accidental nuke armed BUFF trip cross-country? Accidentally selling missile parts to Taiwan? I won't argue that there's some crap out there regarding the roles/missions argument, stuff along the lines of "we should do away with the entire Air Force, roll it into the Army, and use helos for CAS because COIN is the only type of war we'll every fight," but generally speaking I find that kind of crap to be outweighed by the stuff that's actually true. Like the laundry list above.

Finally, regarding Chris' comment, I would argue the exact opposite. ORM stuff at home needs to be looked at, but restricting a soldier from drinking in a combat zone isn't about safety, it's about "not offending Muslim sensibilities," as he put it. More bluntly, it's about winning a war. It's the same reason Army brass was falling all over themselves to apologize for that dumbass NCO who was shooting a Qu'ran. As a classical liberal, it doesn't make me particularly happy. But as a future military officer, it's what is necessary to win the war. End of story.

There are a lot of complaints about the Air Force not contributing to the war effort and I’d like to ask one question: What do you want us to do? No, seriously, tell the Air Force what you need. I’ve read the guidance from the CFACC and from the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders (I didn’t serve in Afghanistan, so I haven’t seen their guidance) and I can tell you, there is nothing in there that specifically tasks the Air Force with a line of operation. There are some minor requests in there, which the Air Force is meeting, but there is no major line item that anyone (that I know of) can point to and say, “the Air Force isn’t living up to its end of the bargain, we asked for this and you guys didn’t provide it.”

As any good Air Force officer, I have read FM 3-24. So I know that in a counter-insurgency fight, there are three things expected of air power: limited close air support, air re-supply/transport, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). And lo and behold, these are the three things that MNF/C-I have asked of the Air Force. So let’s look at each of them in turn.

Close Air Support. The MNF/C-I requirement is for us to be able to have aircraft over a Troops-in-Contact situation in a given amount of time. The Air Force has scheduled aircraft and established orbits that allow us to meet that requirement anywhere in Iraq. If you want us there sooner, put it in the guidance and we will adjust as necessary. There is a problem with the air tasking process that involves both the Air Force AND the Corps, but its outside the scope of this discussion for now.

CAS is a difficult and highly dangerous mission. From 20,000 feet, or even as low as 10,000 feet, you can NOT tell the difference between friendly and enemy ground forces with the Mark 1 eyeball. Targeting pods have made this much better and additional technologies such as Blue Force Tracker and Situational Awareness Data-Link, help but they don’t solve the problem. The actual solution to this problem is correct processes.

In the history of CAS there are many, many unfortunate incidents of fratricide. In the vast majority of these cases, the problem was not that the pilot couldn’t tell friend from foe (as noted above, he can’t), but that the process was not adhered to and somebody inadvertently called in fires on their own position. So it takes specialized training and PRACTICE to make sure that these things don’t happen under the stresses of combat.

For this reason, we have JOINT terminal attack controllers. The JTAC is a graduate of the JOINT Firepower Control Course (or its equivalent). The Marine and Navy ANGLICOs count. The British/Aussie/Canadian/Dutch/German/and hell even the ROK JTACs all count. Nobody says that Air Force jets will ONLY drop for Air Force JTACs. What the JOINT publication 3-09.3 does say is that you will have a certified JTAC controlling close air support. The Army has chosen not to send its troops through the JFCC, instead, demanding that the Air Force put Air Liaison Officers and JTACs into their units to help not only with the control of CAS but also with the planning of integrated air-land battle. And the Air Force said, “okay.” But nobody said, “I’m not going to drop bombs for some Army dude.”

Additionally, if you read JP 3-09.3, you will find guidance in there for “CAS without a JTAC.” We used to call this “emergency CAS” but we realized that just because you didn’t have a JTAC with you didn’t necessarily mean it was an emergency and we didn’t want to get caught up in semantic discussions about what did constitute an “emergency.” (Was it friendly casualties? Proximity to the enemy? Force ratios?) Instead, we just say, “hey, you gotta JTAC? Nope? Okay, lets go with the established procedures then for CAS without a JTAC.” And that’s a process that every one of our CAS pilots actually trains to for just those situations. If you need air support, you will get air support. We don’t care what uniform you are wearing. But there a procedures in place to save people from their own ignorance.

With regards to who supports what, yes, Attack Aviation provides support to ground maneuvers. But you have to understand the limits of their platform. As was pointed out by a previous comment, Attack Aviation can not take a beating but more importantly, they are limited in the weapons they carry. Admittedly, they are more responsive in the right situations with the right targets. CAS is a hammer which is not always appropriate for killing the fly, but it has its place as well. One of my favorite incidents was the pursuit of five insurgents into a building. The Army engaged it with a TOW, a Javelin, and then Attack Aviation hit it with two Hellfires and a couple hundred rounds of 30 mike-mike. Then we watched the five insurgents run out the back of the building, across the street, and into another house. Finally, the JTAC was able to convince the commander (a difficult task for a Senior Airmen talking to a light colonel) that the jets overhead could engage with the new “low collateral damage” bomb. Once the commander gave the thumbs up, one bomb was dropped on the house. Half the house collapsed but none of the surrounding structures were damaged. And all five insurgents were found dead inside. Not always the right tool, but when it is, we are effective. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve seen Army commanders ask for Attack Aviation to “level that building.” No offense, but you can’t do it. You can put lots of holes in it, but if you want it leveled, you want a bomb and that means CAS. Lastly, and most importantly, its the Army guy (or the Marine) who decides if the Air Force can employ, not the Air Force. Its the Army commander who is afraid of collateral damage (because he’s the one who’ll have to pay the reparations and apologize) not the pilot. We do what we’re told to do and any limits you see on airpower are *almost* always the restrictions applied to us by the land owning commander.

Yes, counter-insurgency requires us to walk softly. FM 3-24 and General Petraeus have made that abundantly clear. The Air Force is risk averse in combat because the guys on the ground don’t want us screwing up their very delicate counter-insurgency operations. That’s why we take our cue from the land component. The Air Force could have leveled Baghdad a hundred times over. But that wouldn’t have exactly been good for the counter-insurgency. Trust me, I have had many, many bitter fights over the JAG suggesting that what I wanted to do was a bad idea. And I’ve had the chaffing from the ROE handcuffs. I don’t like it but its not my call. And its not just an Air Force thing.

Air mobility. This isn’t just about hauling beans and bullets, though that is key. There is a saying (I can’t remember who said it but I believe it was Napoleon) that “amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.” And the Air Force takes that to heart. We have added mobility pilots to our most advanced school (more on that later) and we’ve created a “Top Gun” of sorts for our maintenance and mobility officers as well. We are trying to figure out the best way to move those beans and bullets that we can.

Among these advancements is the requirement for a “joint precision airdrop system.” In other words, using the same technology that puts our GPS-aided bombs on target to put supplies inside the wire of a forward operating base so it doesn’t get dropped into bad guy territory. For those of you familiar with the 9-line used to call in CAS, we’ve developed a similar process by which Army guys can call in emergency re-supply. And we’ve prepositioned aircraft with the necessary supplies so that they can launch and do the immediate air drop. All of this was developed, tested, funded, and proven in just the last few years as we have adapted to our counter-insurgency effort.

Lastly, the days of Soldiers getting wounded and taking weeks to get back to a decent field hospital before they finally got evac’d out to a real hospital are gone. Within a couple of days, seriously wounded Soldiers find themselves in Germany at one of the best trauma medical centers currently working in the military. When you tell us what you need, we deliver (pun intended) but you gotta tell us. Air mobility is good for flexibility and speed, its not great for large supply requirements, but we can help take trucks off the road to lessen the IED potential. And we’re still working that issue.

ISR. The Air Force brings some incredibly unique capabilities to the fight. The reason NASIC added an S and several hundred people after 9/11 was because it became a center for second and third phase processing. The things we can now see in imagery, the products that can be built, and the analysis that goes into them is eye-watering. And when used properly, the effect is brilliant.

The problem is, not everybody knows how to use this stuff the right way. Or they don’t ask the right questions so they don’t get the right product. We’re working on that. We’ve pushed new liaison officers down to each division just to support the ISR effort. We have reorganized our reach back ISR organizations so that they are aligned by geographic area. The results have been incredible and they keep getting better.

Which brings us to an understanding of how the Air Force does ISR. We have many, many analysts pouring over the imagery, video feeds, moving target indications, and signals intelligence that our aircraft collect. Some of this is done on the aircraft themselves but the vast majority of it is done by guys on the ground back in the States. They correlate information, reference databases and conduct forensic review of various information sources. It takes many, many people to do this and the footprint for pushing these guys forward would be unbearable.

The Army, in my experience, generally just wants a UAV to fly over an area and if they see something on the feed good, if they don’t, oh well. The Air Force, on the other hand, collects the video regardless of what was initially seen because we can use it to build or contribute to other products. There is a lot more analysis done on Air Force owned and operated UAVs than on Army UAVs (different uses, different mindsets—I’ve been there and seen it myself). So when Secretary Gates says, “put 50 more airframes into theater to support the Army” what the Air Force hears is “put 50 more airframes in Iraq and find 5,000 more analysts to exploit the data.” As you can imagine, it ain’t easy finding, let alone training, 5,000 analysts out of thin air.

Add to that the fact that you have to deconflict the frequencies being used for all of those additional aircraft. Its not that it can’t be done. It just can’t be done quickly or easily. Here in the States, the electromagnetic spectrum is carefully controlled and managed by the FCC. There is very little of that being done in Iraq. And you don’t really want your UAV suddenly falling under the control of somebody who doesn’t realize they are controlling a UAV. It happens, we lose aircraft because of it, this isn’t “risk aversion.”

Of course, if you add 50 aircraft to the skies, you need a way of deconflicting them from other aircraft. Two UAVs trade paint in the sky, that’s bad. A UAV gets sucked into a jet engine or impacts a tail rotor and you have a much bigger problem. So somebody has to sort this mess out, particularly over the most congested airspace on the planet, Baghdad.

The Joint Forces Air Component Commander does not have to be an Air Force guy. It only has to be the guy with the preponderance of air assets AND the ability to control them. The Army ALWAYS has the preponderance of air assets. But the Army is NEVER the JFACC because they cannot control the airspace. Army airspace management is procedural. In other words, they use specific means of deconflicting the airspace based on what they are being told. They do not have the radars or the air traffic control systems necessary to keep aircraft from flying into each other.

Since most Army air assets fly below 3,000 feet and use visual deconfliction or established air corridors to navigate around, the problem is manageable. Above 3,000 feet and you now have aircraft that are unable to use visual deconfliction and you require greater flexibility than that provided by air corridors. So you need actual air traffic controllers who are staring at radar scopes who can clear aircraft into particular areas, demand altitude changes, and recommend different flight paths. The Army is currently not equipped, manned, or trained to do this and unless they are willing to start spending the Air Force’s equivalent budget to do just that INSTEAD of buying tanks or housing Soldiers, its probably best that the Air Force retain that capability on its own.

This is what drives the UAV fight. The Air Force doesn’t really care about owning the UAVs. What we do care about is the fact that operators who are not pilots (that is FAA-certified) are driving non-standardized systems around ABOVE 3,000 feet (this includes the Shadow, Warrior Alpha, and I-GNAT). That means there are assets out there that do not necessarily conform to any air traffic control standard being flown by guys who have not undergone the very precise training of pilot/navigator school and therefore you just rapidly increased the likelihood of something very, very bad happening.

Plus, if you actually want your UAVs to be more useful than 7-11 store cameras with wings, it would be nice if your information went somewhere other than just the TOC floor. There is a huge gain to be had from the TOC being able to see the video, don’t get me wrong, but there is even more that could be done if the imagery went to the same places that our current Predator feeds went. The SOF guys like the analysis we provide because they let the video go back to the highly trained analysts in the States. The conventional Army prefers a more direct video but they lose out on all that potential analysis. Good for right now but not good for the longer term fight.

To say that airpower can’t win wars is a foolish argument. It ranks right up there with claiming that the naval component can win a war on its own. Or even that the land component can win a war on its own. The Civil War is over, we will never again face a situation where one service is going to do it all on its own. We are the premier fighting force on the planet because we can integrate our forces. We don’t just do “combined arms” warfare but rather we engage in coordinated, integrated, multi-service operations that leverage the strengths of the different services in order to mitigate the weaknesses of each.

Under no circumstances can the Air Force conduct counter-insurgency warfare. We are not the correct branch for it. But when OIF kicked off and the Army was driving north faster than anyone expected, the Air Force had the speed and flexibility to lead the effort by targeting pockets of massed forces, eliminating the enemy’s command and control, and when the dust blew in, we STILL wiped out the enemy forces using a combination of JSTARS and GPS-aided munitions. There are those in the Air Force who claim we can “win” the wars on our own (and they cite the opening of Desert Storm, as if we just “let the Army play” for grins or Kosovo) but I think you would find that most of us who actually deal with this type of thing for real (not just the graduates of our various professional military education schools) knows that its a joint (or more correctly, coalition) effort that wins wars.

Furthermore, this argument that “nobody will attempt an old fashion” war is bizarre to me. After every war, some genius comes along and says, “war will never be the same again.” And yet, we always seem to find ourselves going toe to toe with somebody about every 20 years or so. I will agree that it is unlikely that we will see certain things again (most of our enemies know that it doesn’t matter how deep you bury your command post, we will find and kill it, likewise, fixed surface-to-air threats are a thing of the past). And it is highly unlikely that counter-insurgency following a successful war will go away as well. So everyone pretty much needs to prepare themselves for the fact that first we are going to go toe-to-toe with our enemies conventionally and then we are going to have to pacify the remnants. But claiming that war will “never” be this or it will “always” be this is dangerous. We have to be prepared for “full spectrum” operations. The Israelis learned this lesson the hard way with their last fight, one of their key lessons learned being that they had focused so much on counter-insurgency that they could no longer conduct combined arms conventional warfare. It is so much better when you can learn from someone else’s mistakes...let’s not ignore this one.

So airpower is not going to do it alone. But its also not just there to support the infantry. We do have our own missions as well. We integrate with the land component just as the land component must integrate with us. We have a strategic and operational role to play as well that the land component cannot be a part of because of distance, denied territory, etc. Let’s not start putting on our ACUs just yet (though they are infinitely superior to our ABUs!)

Responses to random comments posted above:

I also get a kick out of people speaking negatively about the use of technology in warfare. The guys who fought their way through the hedge rows of northern France would have given anything to have the stuff our guys take for granted now. GPS-aided munitions? JSTARS? Multi-spectral imagery? NVGs? Blue Force Tracker? These things do not solve the problems of warfare but they allow us to use considerably fewer people to do a much more precise job. The reason Dresden had to be fire bombed or Nagasaki had to be nuked was because that US military did not have our current capabilities with regards to precision. When your infantry platoon was limited to just what they could see in their immediate vicinity, it was considerably harder to conduct maneuver warfare compared to now, when you can now get streaming video from fighter targeting pods or UAVs circling overhead. Technology is an enabler. It changes tactics and it makes us more efficient but it does not replace the warrior. We equip our men, we don’t man equipment...

To clarify, “Top Gun” is about the Navy. Our equivalent is the USAF Weapons School (five and half months vs. Top Gun’s 9 weeks). And our Weapons School does include Space, Intelligence, and Air Mobility. Whether we think these things are sexy or not, the Air Force values tactical excellence enough in these areas to include them in the premier air power school house. (The Marines have a similar opinion with their MAWTS-1 school which even includes enlisted Marines...good on ‘em, we’re working on that ourselves.)

When you send a Soldier to kick in the door of some insurgent house, you know he will be successful because he has superior training to anyone else on the planet. He’s run through numerous drills, he’s had years of training, and he’s had the mentorship of senior NCOs and young officers who have been there before him. I cannot do what he does. Not because I am physically unable or because I am stupid (though both could be valid arguments) but because I have not benefited from that training or been mentored by those experts.

On the other hand, I would not want to send that young Soldier before the Armed Services Committee to win appropriations for the Army’s fiscal year budget. Nor would I want him to plan out the systems development of the Army for the next twenty-five years. Why? Because he hasn’t been trained for it. He hasn’t had the opportunity to work on smaller projects, build budgets for lesser amounts, or negotiate contracts. He hasn’t been mentored by those who have done those things.

The key here is that both of these are necessary skills. And both require years of training, education, and mentorship to be effective. And going to war in Congress is not nearly the same as going to war in Iraq but it is still a form of conflict that needs to be mastered by someone who understands the tactics, techniques, and procedures that work. So there is a reason why the military has “bureaucrats” (whether you use that word negatively or not). Do I want a career budgeting officer to run a fighter wing? No, of course not. But does it happen because the Air Force personnel system only looks for rank and pulse? Absolutely. But the system does correct itself. Those who are needed are eventually found and emplaced (many, many of my assignments have been the work of ‘by name requests’ and back door negotiations). Those who aren’t needed or who become obstacles, get tasked with making coffee. And when you walk into the AOC and see a full-bird colonel making coffee for the JFACC, nobody has any mistake that she is being purposefully marginalized. A screw-up by the personnel system got her into a job she wasn’t qualified for (and everyone knew it) but she was not allowed to become a problem. They worked around her. The system is far from perfect, but give credit to the actual people who make decisions and don’t worry too much about “the system.”

Serbia had a very capable air defense system (reference the F-117 and F-16 shoot downs). And they also opposed us in the air with MiG-29s and a few indigenously produced aircraft. None of which were successful, many of which ended up as stars on the sides of our jets. So that “fact” was just wrong.

Additionally, it is disingenuous of you to say that airpower did not contribute significantly to the early roll-up of the Taliban in 2001-2002. And I suspect you know it. You were making a point but you made it the wrong way. Your specific comment about “Ran some of them out of the country briefly, but we’re still dying there” is just spiteful. Very easily, I could make the point that the Army and Marines have now been on the ground there for seven years, why aren’t you done yet? The first phase of that war relied on a few SF bubbas with a wholly unreliable local force being supported by unbelievable precision and overwhelming firepower from the air. Did we win it? No, but we made it a helluva lot easier to operate there than if we hadn’t been around (ask the Russians or the Brits).

Yes, most Air Force tours are now six months to a year. We will not follow the Army into the nightmare of 15 months. I understand why you did it but it was bad for your force and there’s no reason the Air Force should do that just to share in the misery. More importantly, as was pointed out previously, we don’t actually get to drop a lot of bombs now a days. So skills are very quickly atrophying. I need someplace for my guys to drop bombs, and yes, practice skill sets outside of CAS (air-to-air, strategic attack, CSAR, etc.) I cannot do that in Iraq or Afghanistan, so I need to rotate my force home regularly to keep up their currencies. That’s why we still do 90 day rotations with our aircrew. But there is always a replacement crew, so you have nothing to complain about except for jealousy over shorter tours (which is completely understandable).

I spent two years in Korea. I guarantee you that I can put on MOPP gear faster than anybody else in this discussion. We practiced it religiously because we knew chems were going to be a factor and we were going to have to be able to turn wrenches, load bombs, and fly jets while wearing all of that crap. I don’t know who the captain was that you spoke to but he never served in Korea.

We cannot predict our next war. We have never been good at that. Just when we think we know who’s on the docket, somebody else starts some trouble. We cannot afford to assume that our next opponent will not be a peer or that the next fight won’t be conventional. Anybody remember Cope India from about four years ago? The Indians’ were kind enough to show us what the Su-30 was capable of and it was impressive. It was also beyond what we had expected. And they aren’t the only ones flying that jet. The F-15 is good but it may not be good enough. Our pilots can make up for its limitations with training but they can be even more successful with the right jet and the right training. So saying, why is the Air Force wasting time worrying about China when the fight is in Afghanistan or Iraq is short sighted. If we are prepared for China, we will be prepared for any conventional fight short of them. No, it will not prepare us for COIN but we need to avoid replacing one for the other. Both are important and we shouldn’t make the mistake of assuming one is not going to ever happen again.

There are mistakes being made. There are officers in positions they shouldn’t be in. But then there’s the 561st Joint Tactics Squadron that is designed specifically to go into theater every three months, collect the latest lessons learned, and make sure the rest of the force is aware of it. They spin-up the next guys going into theater and they re-write our tactics and doctrine on the fly. We are adapting as fast as we can. We have folks who said, “make ISR like CAS” and we’re working on it. We put ISR liaison officers in the Divisions, we made our Global Hawk more responsive, and we’ve develop tactics and technologies that didn’t exist five years ago. It may not look pretty in the papers, but since when did they ever report the story correctly anyway?

Sorry for the long response. You guys have a great discussion going on here and I didn’t want to miss out.

Cheers!

Wow BK, that's a data dump worthy of a patch-wearer! Nice job. What airframe do you fly or are you one of those lucky intel bubba's?

And frankly, it still pisses me off that us enlisted folks can't do weapon's school. You mentioned something might be in the works - care to share please?

I've quoted you and linked to you here: http://consul-at-arms.blogspot.com/2008/05/re-officer-rot-in-unites-states-air.html

Well, I guess the USAF has no issues it's just everyone else...my bad.

To BK:

Wow, you must be an acolyte. Most of your response is rambling, incoherent and irrelevant. The article is about the lack of strategic thought and tactical leadership; both that have been lacking in the Air Force.

First, your strawman about technology is irrelevant. It’s about the use of technology in a strategic manner to solve problems and the use of tactical leadership to bring to bear the technology you need in the places and in the numbers you need it. SECDEF Gates gave a good example of regarding the Air Force’s lack of concern for more UAVs.

Second, Air Force leadership is hopelessly stuck fighting the Cold War. Fighter pilots dominate the leadership of the Air Force. If you are not a fighter pilot then your hopes for advancement is limited at best. Just look at who picks up major commands and who puts on the stars.

Non-fighter participation in Weapons School is irrelevant, because the leadership only allows non-fighters to CYA. I’ve worked Red Flag and Green Flag. Most of the non-fighters (at least the Air Force types) were not invited to planning or debriefs. The scenarios were Cold War sets.

I worked for a CFACC, who was an Air Force fighter pilot. The Army would submit their requests to the CFACC. The CFACC would ignore the request and come up with an air plan that had no resemblance to what was asked for. I spent half my time fighting Air Force types trying to get the correct load out on platforms and the right platforms in the air, but I was constantly overruled by some O-5 that wanted to suck up the the Air Force General.

CAS is still frowned upon in the Air Force. I’m sorry, but this is the truth. I need only point to the F-22 and how much money the Air Force is spending to push the product. The F-22 doesn’t address any need currently and in the future. Additionally, the F-22 is irrelevant since most potential adversaries will buy cheaper and more plentiful SAM systems like the SA-20 (S-400). Killing a $500 Million aircraft with a $25 million dollar system is a winning strategy.

Additionally, while working for the CFACC, the CAS requirements were always cut to address “air superiority” needs. So the CFACC, an Air Force guy, would unilaterally make a decision to cut CAS. The funny thing is this bozo picked up a star and got major command. Talk about rot.

When I was in Afghanistan, the two platforms used the most was the A-10 and the B-52, two non-fighter aircraft, two aircraft that the Air Force doesn’t like. We loved those platforms because they had long loiter times and carried a lot of ordinance. The F-22 doesn’t do either. The F-22 would have been as useful as the French fighters in Afghanistan that carried no ordinance and took weekends off.

Finally, Cope India is a lie. Propaganda produced by senior Air Force officers to push the F-22. It was a joke around PACOM offices. Pure and utter propaganda and it sickens me to my stomach that the Air Force would sink to such unethical methods. Just in case you are wondering, I was in PACOM at the time. Additionally, as mentioned above, China has been buying SA-20s to deal with the F-22 threat making the F-22 dated even before it gets off the production line.

Just so people don't feel like I'm piling on the Air Force. The Navy spent $11 billion on the "Navy-Marine Corps Intranet" (NMCI). Unfortunately, the easiest way for me to communicate with Army and Air Force types was to print out the stuff and hand carry it to them. When problems were brought to the attention of the Navy leadership, the response was shut up and stop complaining. And to piss off the Army, all I need to mention is Stryker. I really enjoyed the $2.5 million propaganda video that the Army leadership put out. Maybe they should have put that money into testing against the RPG (the most numerous man-portable weapon system out there, heck I think I saw a kid roaming the streets of Detroit with one.)

I already addressed Secretary Gates direction for more UAVs. Its not as simple as sending more aircraft to the theater. There is considerably more involved in the process as outlined above.

The fact that you refer to it as Green Flag makes me think you've participated since it changed from Air Warrior (when the scenario at the NTC, which is what drives the AW/GF scenario, was indeed a conventional fight). However, since the exercise changed to Green Flag, the NTC has used a more contemporary scenario that emphasizes counter-insurgency. The USAF does not develop the scenarios for GF, the Army does and now the scnearios are less conventionally focused. Additionally, you must have only supported Air Warrior I/Green Flag West, because Air War II/Green Flag East has always been an infantry-centric/low intensity fight. Not much fun for the USAF but still a training event none-the-less.

You are correct in that Red Flag remains a conventional/peer threat fight. Since we already have two exercises devoted to the non-peer threat (GF East/West), the USAF needs someplace to continue training for the peer/near peer adversary. However, there is still a CAS component to every RF (though without Army participation, which is stupid but is caused by a number of different factors) and every night vul of RF includes Dynamic Targeting which focuses on the hunt for HVIs (but again, without signficant increase in Army participation, the exercise lacks a considerable amount of realism in that regards).

If you want to argue that GF-West should be the required exercise prior to each rotation into theater, I am all on-board with that. The fact that Red Flag is the mandatory exercise, is to me, the dumbest thing the Air Force does. I never said the Air Force didn't have its faults or did things that were flat out wrong. I simply attempted to explain away some misconceptions.

I have no idea of what you are referring to when you talk about non-fighters not being involved in the debriefs or briefs. I have been to many, many, many briefs and debriefs at Red Flag and the rooms are always packed. Yes, there are different debriefs for different players (the Air-to-Air debrief is scheduled at the same time as the Air-to-Ground debrief which is scheduled at the same time as the C2ISR debrief). Usually, at the unit's discretion, there is a representative in each debrief that they had a role. (For example, there is always C2ISR plarticipants in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground debriefs, but there may only be an air mobility rep in the air-to-air debrief if one of their aircraft got shot down). I honestly don't know what briefs/debriefs you are talking about so its possible I wasn't present for the same things you are discussing.

I can only assume you are referrencing your time in PACOM when you talk about working for a CFACC. Since there is no "air superiority" fight in Iraq or Afghanistan there are exactly zero (0) SEAD, OCA, or DCA missions on the ATO. The vast majority of all combat sorties are CAS or XCAS. I will agree that the CFACC continues to attempt to find missions that will allow us to operate separate from the ground commander (XINT specifically) but the JFC has always squashed those efforts. (That's the key... the CFACC works for the JFC who does the apportionment of all missions for the Air Force, the CFACC does the allocation...straight out of Joint Doctrine.)

The F-22 was never designed to do CAS. It was not in its original DOC statement which details what missions it is supposed to do. The F-22 was also not designed to defeat the SA-20. The F-22 was designed as an air superiority fighter and that's all, specifically with escorting the B-2 into denied areas so that the B-2 could deal with the double digit SAM threat (along with other joint capabilities.)

The F-22 was designed with the mantra "not a pound for air-to-ground." However, that changed for purely political reasons and the jet can now carry air to ground ordnance. Yes, their pilots train to that role but since the vast majority are air-to-air retreads, they have very little talent for it and the learning curve is very steep as I have seen on multiple occassions. But the point remains, you can't criticize the F-22 for not being a good CAS fighter because it wasn't designed for that. It was designed to deal with the Su-30 and its eventual follow-ons (the fourth and soon to be fifth generation fighters).

Exercise experiences with a CFACC who didn't really have to answer to a JFC is not a realistic argument. Again, the CFACC works for the JFC and could not "unilaterally cut" CAS missions. The JFC apportions adn the JFACC allocates. Those are the rules and they are not flexible.

You are right loiter time is important and the Air Force doesn't spend a lot of effort thinking about that for two reasons. One, there is a belief in the Air Force, incorrectly, that we can somehow guess when assets are going to be needed. I spent most of last year arguing with the CAOC about that specific problem. That sometimes you really do need to have aircraft overhead 24 hours a day since you don't know when something bad is going to happen. Secondly, the Air Force prefers to just send aircraft to the tanker. Of course, just like the objective is always on the seam of two maps, the fighters area always on the tanker when you need them. You won't get any argument from me on that point.

You are valid in pointing out that the results of Cope India (that the USAF got stomped by the Indian Air Force) was false. Based on the "handcuffs" that our pilots had and the assumptions that were allowed to the Indian pilots, it was not an accurate estimation of what a real fight between the two would have been. However, it was our first opportunity to see the Su-30 in action and that was still very valuable and really does point to the advancements that have occurred since the F-15C was brought on-line. The Su-30 is the next generation jet. More importantly, it is the earliest example of those next generation jets. There are more advanced ones already being built and sold. So how long do we wait to update our forces? Regardless of the results of Cope India, it was a glimpse at the future.

I won't argue the ethics of politics (that being a term in contradiction to begin with). But I do believe the Air Force needs the F-22 and the F-35. I believe it takes a long time to develop these capabilities. And I believe that if we cling to airframes that are already beginning to become maintenance nightmares the cost in money and lives will be too great.

And the SA-20 was not designed to defeat the F-22. Regardless of what its capabilities are vs. the F-22, the SA-20 is an incredibly capable SAM system that can engage a host of targets. It is a very dangerous threat and one that the Air Force spends a great deal of time trying to figure out how to defeat. Which of course occurs while others are trying to figure out the best ways to engage a high speed moving car, how to best find IEDs from the air, and how to provide more responsive ISR from all out platforms (not just UAVs).

Andy,

There are currently enlisted at the USAFWS, specifically the Advanced Weapons Director School (AWDS) which trains up the enlisted weapons directors on the AWACS. They are a sub-part of the 8th Weapons Squadron. However, they will soon be going away because the Air Force decided to do away with enlisted weapons directors.

That's what should really piss you off. The enlisted force brings experience and continuity to our operations. Officers change assignments and get promoted into non-operational jobs too quickly to really be of any use. But I'm not clear on why the decision was made.

There is a HUGE push on right now to start up a Weapons School (like AWDS, probably a sub-set of the A-10 WPS and probably only three months long) for the JTACS. This has gotten some high level support and they've already started looking at real-estate on Nellis for where those guys will operate. However, they are already beginning to run into some of the same problems the intelligence bubbas found.

Namely, the chief enlisted functional managers who don't want to give up control of the enlisted force or their assignment process. As you probably know, Weapons Officers don't get assigned like the rest of the Air Force officer corps, the USAFWS actually has considerable say as to where were end up. So the enlisted guys don't care for that.

The intelligence squadron had already set aside funding for the enlisted program, produced sample flyers for the recruitment, and had identified the initial cadre to run the program. Unfortunately, the functionals wouldn't relent and the program never happened. Although the plans are still in the place but the money and the potential cadre have all moved on. So there's still some hope out there. (Actually, I don't recall if you're an intel guy or not...)

Mike,

The risk management queep you are dealing with in regards to commander's signatures for sky-diving and the like is an AETC phenomenon. You are unlikely to see that in any other command. But there are few things more frustrating then when as a retread with combat deployment experience in your background, if you go through an AETC school under the age of 26, you still have to ask "mother may I" like a high school kid borrowing the car. Its stupid but its AETC and I just avoid that command like the plague.

My opinion of drinking in Muslim countries is that its more to do with the Army's distrust of its young soldiers ability to walk along with weapons and live ammo and not kill themselves or others. My experience with the Army is that they have considerablly less trust of their young Soldiers (their officers and NCOs are highly respected and for good reason). So to keep discipline from getting out of hand and to limit the number of inadvertant discharges, they don't allow drinking.

Al Udied is in a Muslim country as well but its completely under Air Force command. So they allow three drinks per day. Different attitudes toward their young enlisted. In my opinion. I could be wrong.

Thanks for the clarification regarding the AETC phenomenon. As I'm sure you're aware, the commander's signature B.S. is just one of many examples I can think of off the top of my head, several of which have adversely affected training by restricting certain activities or preventing them altogether. Very frustrating.

Re: the drinking issue, based on what I've seen (which, coming from a cadet, is possibly the only way that phrase is any more dangerous than coming from a 2LT), it would seem that your assessment of the Army and Air Force attitudes toward their junior enlisted is correct. However, I would disagree that this is the reason for the difference in alcohol consumption. While both are in Muslim countries, two things are different: one, the relations with the host nation are much more positive and low key in Qatar than in Iraq or Afghanistan, and two, the government and populace in Qatar are more liberal than in Iraq or Afghanistan, which is why I think the rules are different. Contrast that with the regulations at USAF bases in Saudi prior to us pulling out.

BK,

Yeah, I'm intel (1N0) and have always wanted to go to weapons school. Oh well. We have all the material and training, which is actually what we base our intel internal training on, so that's something at least.

Mike,

It's probably not any consolation, but units under that Navy's training command (CNET) are even worse than AETC. Just play the AETC game knowing full well that you'll get to the real Air Force afterward and you'll be free of all the babysitting.

BK, thanks for your comments. I'm glad to hear that there is some streamlining going on to help get the data to the folks who need it. While at NAIC, and before they had quite as many data streams, I'd occasionally get called down the hall to look at something (by the time I left, I was the only full-time fighter guy there... hopefully that's changed... and I spent a lot of time "translating" between the operational and engineering communities.)